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Abstract We consider two–sided many–to–many matching markets in which each worker may work for
multiple firms and each firm may hire multiple workers. We study individual and group manipulations
in centralized markets that employ (pairwise) stable mechanisms and that require participants to submit
rank order lists of agents on the other side of the market. We are interested in simple preference ma-
nipulations that have been reported and studied in empirical and theoretical work: truncation strategies,
which are the lists obtained by removing a tail of least preferred partners from a preference list, and
the more general dropping strategies, which are the lists obtained by only removing partners from a
preference list (i.e., no reshuﬄing).
We study when truncation/dropping strategies are exhaustive for a group of agents on the same
side of the market, i.e., when each match resulting from preference manipulations can be replicated
or improved upon by some truncation/dropping strategies. We prove that for each stable mechanism,
dropping strategies are exhaustive for each group of agents on the same side of the market (Theorem 1),
i.e., independently of the quotas. Then, we show that for each stable mechanism, truncation strategies
are exhaustive for each agent with quota 1 (Theorem 2). Finally, we show that this result cannot be
extended neither to individual manipulations when the agent’s quota is larger than 1 (even when all
other agents’ quotas equal 1 – Example 1), nor to group manipulations (even when all quotas equal 1 –
Example 2).
1 Introduction
In part–time labor markets and some professional entry–level labor markets a worker may be employed
by a number of different firms. An important example of the latter are British entry–level medical
labor markets which involve graduating medical students and teaching hospitals. Each student seeks two
residency positions: one for a medical program and one for a surgical program. Roth (1991) modeled the
British entry–level medical labor markets as many–to–two matching markets.
In this paper, we consider many–to–many matching markets in which each worker may work for
multiple firms and each firm may hire multiple workers. Agents have preferences over subsets of potential
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partners.1 An assignment between workers and firms is called a matching. A central concept in the
matching literature is (pairwise) stability. A matching is called stable if all agents are matched to an
acceptable subset of partners and there is no unmatched worker–firm pair who both would prefer to
match (and possibly dismiss some current partners). Roth (1984a) studied a general many–to–many
model and showed that if the agents’ preferences satisfy substitutability then the set of stable matchings
is non–empty.2
In many–to–many matching markets, the set of stable matchings might be different from the core
(Blair, 1988) and also there might be stable matchings that can be blocked by coalitions of more than
two agents (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990). Sotomayor (1999b) studied the stronger concept of setwise
stability and showed that in the many–to–many model the set of stable matchings, the core, and the set
of setwise stable matchings do not coincide. However, potential larger blocking coalitions in complex real–
life settings might have more difficulties to organize themselves. In fact, Roth (1991, page 422) suggested
that for many–to–many markets such as the British entry–level medical labor markets, stability is still
of primary importance.
Many real–life matching markets employ a centralized mechanisms to match workers to firms and
the only information that the matchmaker asks from the participating agents are their preferences over
the other side of the market. In particular, we assume that the agents’ quotas (i.e., the number of
available slots) are commonly known by the agents (because, for instance, the quotas are determined
by laws).3 In practice, agents are only allowed to submit ordered lists of individual partners (potential
partners that are not listed are assumed to be unacceptable). Presumably the agents’ preferences over
sets of potential partners are responsive (Roth, 1985a): for each agent i, the convenience to match with
an additional potential partner j by possibly replacing some partner k only depends on the individual
characteristics of j and k (and whether the quota is reached). Throughout the current paper we focus
on mechanisms that only demand ordered lists of potential individual and acceptable partners and keep
the responsiveness assumption.4 A mechanism is stable if for each reported profile of ordered lists it
produces a matching that is stable with respect to the reported profile. Two important examples of such
mechanisms are the so–called worker–optimal and firm–optimal stable mechanisms which are based on
the deferred acceptance algorithm (introduced by Gale and Shapley, 1962, for the one–to–one case and
adapted by Roth, 1984a, to the many–to–many case).
Even though there is evidence that clearinghouses that employ stable mechanisms often perform
better than those that employ unstable mechanisms,5 no stable mechanism is immune to preference
manipulation (Dubins and Freedman, 1981, and Roth, 1982). This fact immediately triggers a ques-
tion: What types of strategies should a strategic agent consider? In the present paper, we focus on
two types of “simple” preference manipulations that have been reported and studied in empirical and
theoretical work. The first class of preference manipulations is that of truncation strategies (Roth and
Vande Vate, 1991). A truncation strategy is a list that is obtained from an agent’s true preference list
by removing a tail of its least preferred acceptable partners. Truncation strategies have been observed
in practice, for instance, in the sorority rush (Mongell and Roth, 1991). The second class of preference
manipulations consists of dropping strategies (Kojima and Pathak, 2009). A dropping strategy is a list
that is obtained from an agent’s true preference list by removing acceptable partners (i.e., no reshuf-
fling). Obviously, each truncation strategy is also a dropping strategy. Roth and Rothblum (1999) studied
the firm–optimal stable mechanism in the many–to–one model. They showed that if a worker’s incom-
plete information is completely symmetric, then it might only gain by reporting a truncation strategy.
Ehlers (2008) obtained a similar result for all so–called priority and linear programming mechanisms.
Coles and Shorrer (2012) examined truncation strategies in the one–to–one model. They established that
also in settings with asymmetric incomplete information about the strategies submitted by the other
agents, workers can truncate lists with little risk of ending up unmatched, but with the potential to
see large gains. Ma (2010) studied truncation strategies and the equilibrium outcomes induced by the
1 Note that agents only have preferences over potential partners on the other side of the market and not over their
colleagues.
2 An agent has substitutable preferences if the agent continues to want to be partners with an agent even if other agents
become unavailable. Note that substitutability excludes complementarities. Substitutability was introduced by Kelso and
Crawford (1982) to show the existence of stable matchings in a many–to–one model with money.
3 In particular, quotas cannot be manipulated (cf. So¨nmez, 1997).
4 Responsiveness implies substitutability, and hence the existence of a stable matching.
5 See, for instance, Roth (1991).
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worker–optimal stable mechanism in one–to–one and many–to–one matching markets. For one–to–one,
he found that if in equilibrium each firm uses a truncation strategy, then the equilibrium outcome is the
firm–optimal matching. For many–to–one, he found that if in equilibrium each firm uses a truncation
strategy, then the equilibrium outcome is either the firm–optimal matching or an unstable matching
with respect to the true preferences. Ashlagi and Klijn (2012) studied effects of manipulations in the
direct-revelation game based on the worker–optimal stable mechanism in one–to–one and many–to–one
matching markets. For one–to–one, they showed that under the worker–optimal stable mechanism, any
weakly successful group manipulation by firms is weakly beneficial to all other firms and weakly harmful
to all workers and any truncation strategy of a firm is weakly beneficial to all other firms and weakly
harmful to all workers. They showed that neither of the results above extends in an appropriate way to
many–to–one: a firm can have dropping strategies and successful manipulations that strictly harm some
other firm and strictly benefit some worker.
Taking the stability requirement for a mechanism to perform well as granted, we study stable mech-
anisms, but do not restrict ourselves to the firm–optimal stable mechanism (as in Roth and Roth-
blum, 1999, and Coles and Shorrer, 2012). On the other hand, we assume a complete information envi-
ronment. We consider the point of view of an individual worker while keeping the other agents’ strategies
fixed. In view of our analysis it is convenient to introduce the truncation/dropping correspondence that
assigns to each preference relation the set of truncation/dropping strategies obtained from the induced
list over individual agents. In one–to–one markets, the truncation correspondence is exhaustive (Roth
and Vande Vate, 1991, Theorem 2) in the sense that for each strategy, the induced match can be repli-
cated or improved upon by some truncation of the list induced by the agent’s true preference relation.6
Kojima and Pathak (2009, Lemma 1) proved that the dropping correspondence is exhaustive for a firm in
the many–to–one model (where workers’ quotas equal one).7 However, their result does not say anything
about possible joint manipulations by a group of workers or a group of firms, nor deals with the possibil-
ity of workers having a quota larger than one.8 We show that for each stable mechanism, the dropping
correspondence is exhaustive for each group of agents on the same side of the market (Theorem 1).
Since Roth and Vande Vate’s (1991) model is one–to–one, their result would not apply to most real–
life matching markets.9 We extend Roth and Vande Vate’s (1991) result by showing that for each stable
mechanism, the truncation correspondence is exhaustive for each agent with quota 1 (Theorem 2). We
complement our second result with two examples to show that it cannot be generalized in the following
two ways. The truncation correspondence is
– neither necessarily exhaustive for an agent with quota larger than 1 even when all other agents’ quotas
equal 1 (Example 1);
– nor necessarily exhaustive for a group of agents on the same side of the market even when all quotas
equal 1 (Example 2).
Our results suggest that if workers and firms are aware of the exhaustiveness of truncation or dropping
correspondences, we can expect them to reveal truthful information regarding the relative rank order
of the listed potential partners. To put our paper in perspective, we briefly mention some of the most
closely related papers on many–to–many matching markets (apart from the already mentioned work by
Roth, 1984a, and Sotomayor, 1999b). Alkan (1999,2001,2002), Ba¨ıou and Balinski (2000), Blair (1988),
Fleiner (2003), Roth (1985b), and Sotomayor (1999a) provided important insights into the lattice struc-
ture of the set of stable matchings in different (many–to–many) models. Mart´ınez et al. (2004) pre-
sented an algorithm to compute the full set of stable matchings when preferences are substitutable.
Sotomayor (2004) provided a mechanism that implements the set of stable matchings when preferences
6 Roth and Vande Vate (1991) studied random stable mechanisms. We rephrase their Theorem 2 to fit it for our frame-
work.
7 In fact, Kojima and Pathak (2009) also considered strategic manipulation by underreporting quotas. We focus on
manipulation via preference lists, and aim to establish “exhaustiveness results” (of truncation and dropping strategies) for
different classes of quota vectors.
8 Note that we only focus on (pairwise) stability and do not consider larger blocking coalitions than worker–firm pairs.
This is not a conceptual contradiction to our study of joint manipulations, since larger blocking coalitions would involve
agents from both sides of the market, while the joint manipulations we study only deal with groups of agents on the same
side of the market. It seems more likely that a group of agents on the same side of the market can carry out a group
manipulation that is actually binding on its members.
9 For each many–to–one market, there is a one–to–one correspondence between its stable matchings and those of a
related one–to–one market. Hence, many properties of the set of stable matchings in the one–to–one model carry over to
the many–to–one model. Yet, with respect to strategic issues, Roth (1985a) showed that the two models are not equivalent.
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are responsive. Klijn and Yazıcı (2012) studied the number and the set of filled slots in stable matchings
when preferences are substitutable and weakly separable. Finally, Echenique and Oviedo (2006), Klaus
and Walzl (2009), Konishi and U¨nver (2006), and Sotomayor (1999b) analyzed the relation between
various solution concepts different from (pairwise) stability on several domains of preferences.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model. In Section 3,
we present and prove our results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
There are two finite and disjoint sets of agents: a set of workers W and a set of firms F . Let I = W ∪F
be the set of agents. We denote a generic worker, firm, and agent by w, f , and i, respectively. For each
agent i, there is an integer quota qi ≥ 1. Worker w can work for at most qw firms and firm f can hire at
most qf workers. Let q = (qi)i∈I .
Let i ∈ I. The set of potential partners of agent i is denoted by Ni. If i ∈ W , Ni = F and if
i ∈ F , Ni = W . A subset of potential partners N ⊆ Ni is feasible (for agent i) if |N | ≤ qi. Let
N (Ni, qi) = {N ⊆ Ni : |N | ≤ qi} denote the collection of feasible subsets of potential partners. The
element ∅ ∈ N (Ni, qi) denotes “being unmatched” or some outside option. Agent i has a complete,
transitive, and strict preference relation i overN (Ni, qi). For eachN,N ′ ∈ N (Ni, qi), we writeN i N ′
if agent i finds N at least as good as N ′, i.e., N i N ′ or N = N ′. Let Pi be the set of all preference
relations for agent i. Let = (i)i∈I . For A ⊆ I, let A= (i)i∈A and −A= (i)i∈I\A.
Let Pi be the restriction of i to {{j} : j ∈ Ni} ∪ {∅}, i.e., individual partners in Ni and being
unmatched. For j, j′ ∈ Ni∪{∅}, we write j Pi j′ if j i j′, and j Ri j′ if j i j′.10 Let Pi be the set of all
such restrictions for agent i. Agent j ∈ Ni is an acceptable partner for agent i if j Pi ∅. Let P = (Pi)i∈I .
For A ⊆ I, let PA = (Pi)i∈A and P−A = (Pi)i∈I\A.
We also represent an agent i’s preferences Pi as an ordered list of the elements in Ni ∪ {∅}. For
instance, Pw = f3 f2 ∅ f1 . . . f4 indicates that w prefers f3 to f2, f2 to being unmatched, and being
unmatched to any other firm.
We assume that for each agent i, i is a responsive extension of Pi (or responsive for short)11 such
that (r1) as long as an agent’s quota is not reached, it prefers to fill a position with an acceptable partner
rather than leaving it unfilled and (r2) an agent if faced with two sets of potential partners that differ
only in one partner, it prefers the set of partners containing the more preferred partner, i.e., for all
N ∈ N (Ni, qi),
(r1) if j ∈ Ni\N and |N | < qi, then N ∪ j i N if and only if j Pi ∅; and
(r2) if j ∈ Ni\N and k ∈ N , then (N\k) ∪ j i N if and only if j Pi k.
A (many–to–many matching) market is given by (W,F,, q) or, when no confusion is possible, (, q) for
short.12
Let (W,F,, q) be a market. A matching is a function µ : I → 2I such that (m1) each agent is
matched to a feasible subset of potential partners and (m2) an agent is matched to a partner if and only
if the partner is matched to the agent, i.e.,
(m1) for all i ∈ I, µ(i) ∈ N (Ni, qi); and
(m2) for all w ∈W and f ∈ F , f ∈ µ(w) if and only if w ∈ µ(f).
Let µ be a matching. Let i, j ∈ I. If j ∈ µ(i) then we say that i and j are matched to one another and
that they are mates in µ. The set µ(i) is agent i’s match.
Next, we describe desirable properties of matchings. First, we are interested in a voluntary participa-
tion condition over the matchings. Formally, a matching µ is individually rational if for each i ∈ I and
each j ∈ µ(i), j Pi ∅.13
Second, we aim to avoid particular blocking pairs that would render a matching unstable. A worker–
firm pair (w, f) is a blocking pair for µ if (b1) a worker w and a firm f are not mates in µ, (b2) w would
10 With some abuse of notation we often write x for a singleton {x}.
11 See Roth (1985a) and Roth and Sotomayor (1989) for a discussion of this assumption.
12 A many–to–one matching market is a market where each agent on one given side of the market has quota 1. A
one–to–one or marriage market is a market where each agent has quota 1.
13 Alternatively, by responsiveness condition (r1), a matching µ is individually rational if no agent would be better off by
breaking a match, i.e., for each i ∈ I and each j ∈ µ(i), µ(i) i µ(i)\j.
4
prefer to add f or replace another firm by f , and (b3) f would prefer to add w or replace another worker
by w, i.e.,
(b1) w 6∈ µ(f);
(b2) [ |µ(w)| < qw and f Pw ∅ ] or [ there is f ′ ∈ µ(w) such that f Pw f ′ ]; and
(b3) [ |µ(f)| < qf and w Pf ∅ ] or [ there is w′ ∈ µ(f) such that w Pf w′ ].14
A matching is (pairwise) stable if it is individually rational and there are no blocking pairs. Let S(, q)
be the set of stable matchings for market (, q). Roth (1984a) showed that the set of stable matchings
is always non–empty. In fact, he showed that for each market (, q), there is a (worker–optimal) stable
matching µW that is weakly preferred by all workers to any other stable matching in S(, q). Formally, for
each w ∈W and each µ ∈ S(, q), µW (w) w µ(w). Similarly, there is a (firm–optimal) stable matching
µF that is weakly preferred by all firms to any other stable matching in S(, q). Note that stability does
not depend on the particular responsive extensions of the agents’ preferences over individual acceptable
partners.15 Hence, we can denote the set of stable matchings for (, q) by S(P, q).
In many–to–one matching markets, the set of stable matchings coincides with the core defined by
weak domination. In addition, ruling out blocking pairs is sufficient for ruling out blocking coalitions that
involve more than two agents. This is not true in many–to–many matching markets. Not only might the
set of stable matchings be different from the core, but also there might be stable matchings that can be
blocked by coalitions of more than two agents (see Sotomayor, 1999b). However, Roth (1991, page 422)
suggested that for certain many–to–many markets, stability is still of primary importance.
A mechanism assigns a matching to each market. We assume that quotas are commonly known by
the agents (because, for instance, the quotas are determined by law).16 Therefore, the only information
that the mechanism asks from the agents are their preferences over the other side of the market. Many
real–life centralized matching markets employ mechanisms that only ask for the ordered lists P = (Pi)i∈I
of individual partners, i.e., they do not depend on the particular responsive extensions. Throughout the
paper we focus on this class of mechanisms. Hence, a mechanism ϕ assigns a matching ϕ(P, q) to each
pair (P, q).17 We often denote agent i’s match ϕ(P, q)(i) by ϕi(P, q). A mechanism ϕ is stable if for each
(P, q), ϕ(P, q) ∈ S(P, q). Two important examples of such mechanisms are the worker–optimal stable
mechanism ϕW and the firm–optimal stable mechanism ϕF which assign to each market its worker–
optimal stable matching and firm–optimal stable matching, respectively.
An important question is whether stable mechanisms are immune to preference manipulations by
strategic agents. A strategy is an (ordered) preference list of a subset of potential partners.18 More
precisely, for each agent i, Pi is the set of strategies. Dubins and Freedman (1981) and Roth (1982)
showed that there is no stable mechanism that is strategy–proof.19 Formally, for each stable mechanism,
ϕ, there is a market (, q) in which some agent i can submit a preference list P ′i different from its true
preference list Pi and obtain a better match, i.e., ϕi(P
′
i , P−i, q) i ϕi(P, q).
Next, we provide the formal definition of two important classes of strategies that have been studied in
the literature. A truncation strategy of a worker w is an ordered list P ′w obtained from Pw by making a tail
of acceptable firms unacceptable (Roth and Vande Vate, 1991). Formally, for a worker w with preferences
Pw over individual firms, P
′
w is a truncation strategy if for any firms f, f
′ ∈ F , (a) [if f R′w f ′R′w ∅ then
f Rw f
′Rw ∅], and (b) [if f P ′w ∅ and f ′ Pw f then f ′ P ′w ∅]. We define a truncation strategy of a firm
similarly.
A dropping strategy of a worker w is an ordered list P ′w obtained from Pw by removing some acceptable
firms, i.e., not necessarily a tail of least preferred firms (Kojima and Pathak, 2009). Formally, for a
worker w with preferences Pw over individual firms, P
′
w is a dropping strategy if for any firms f, f
′ ∈ F ,
[f R′w f
′R′w ∅ implies f Rw f ′Rw ∅]. We define a dropping strategy of a firm similarly.
14 By responsiveness conditions (r1) and (r2), (b2) is equivalent to [ [|µ(w)| < qw and µ(w) ∪ f w µ(w) ] or [there is
f ′ ∈ µ(w) such that (µ(w) \ f ′) ∪ f w µ(w) ] ]. A similar equivalent statement holds for (b3).
15 In fact, the set of stable matchings does not depend on the agents’ orderings of the (individual) unacceptable partners
either.
16 In particular, quotas cannot be manipulated (cf. So¨nmez, 1997).
17 We do not suppress the notation q since the quotas play a role in the definition of stability. Moreover, our results are
also conditional on the values of the quotas.
18 The listed potential partners are interpreted as the acceptable potential partners. The other potential partners are
unacceptable and, since we focus on stable mechanisms, their relative ordering is irrelevant.
19 However, some stable mechanisms are strategy–proof for one side of the market if each agent on that side of the market
has quota 1 (Roth, 1982, Theorem 5).
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A strategy space reductor for i is a correspondence Σ that maps each preference relation i to a
subset of the set of strategies. Formally, a strategy space reductor is a correspondence Σ : Pi ⇒ Pi
such that for each i∈ Pi , the (non–empty) reduced strategy space Σ(i) is a subset of Pi. We focus
on two strategy space reductors: the truncation correspondence and the dropping correspondence. The
truncation correspondence τ associates each preference relation i with the set of truncation strategies
obtained from the corresponding restriction Pi. Similarly, the dropping correspondence δ associates each
preference relation i with the set of dropping strategies obtained from the corresponding restriction Pi.
We next define the exhaustiveness of a strategy space reductor for an individual agent, i.e., when
a strategy space reductor is rich enough to replicate or improve upon any possible match. Let q be a
quota vector, ϕ be a mechanism and Σ be a strategy space reductor. The strategy space reductor Σ
is ϕ–exhaustive for agent i if for each i, each P ′i , and each P−i, there exists Qi ∈ Σ(i) such that
ϕi(Qi, P−i, q) i ϕi(P ′i , P−i, q).
When groups of agents on the same side of the market can jointly carry out strategic manipulations,
we extend the previous definition as follows. Let q be a quota vector, ϕ be a mechanism, and A′ ⊆ A be
a group of agents on the same side of the market A ∈ {W,F}. A (common) strategy space reductor Σ
is ϕ–exhaustive for group A′ if for each A′ , each P ′A′ , and each P−A′ , there exists QA′ ∈
∏
i∈A′ Σ(i)
such that for each i ∈ A′, ϕi(QA′ , P−A′ , q) i ϕi(P ′A′ , P−A′ , q).
Note that ϕ–exhaustiveness for a group of agents implies ϕ–exhaustiveness for an agent, but the
reverse is not true (see, for instance, Theorem 2 and Example 2).
3 Results
In this section, we present and prove our results. Recall that the quotas (qi)i∈I are fixed and cannot be
manipulated. We first consider the dropping correspondence and seek to determine when it is exhaustive.
Kojima and Pathak (2009) considered a many–to–one matching model where for each w ∈W , qw = 1.
Their Lemma 1 implies that for each stable mechanism ϕ, the dropping correspondence is ϕ–exhaustive
for each firm f ∈ F . We extend this result by showing that for each stable mechanism ϕ, the dropping
correspondence is ϕ–exhaustive for a group of agents on the same side of the market, independently of
the vector of the quotas. The proof parallels that of Kojima and Pathak (2009, Lemma 1). The main
difference with their proof is that we need to show that during the procedure to get a stable matching
only firms with vacant positions can be part of blocking pairs.
The constructive proof of Theorem 1 works as follows: For each stable mechanism ϕ, each group
of workers W ′, and each worker w ∈ W ′, (1) take any strategy P ′w, (2) find the matching under this
strategy for ϕ, (3) suppose that w reported the acceptable firms that he was matched to under P ′w in the
same relative order, (4) prove that w is matched to these firms in some stable matching and that stable
mechanism matches him to the same mates.
Theorem 1 Let ϕ be a stable mechanism. The dropping correspondence δ is ϕ–exhaustive for a group
of agents on the same side of the market.20
Proof Let ϕ be a stable mechanism. Let (, q) be a market. Let P be the restriction of  to individual
partners and being unmatched. Without loss of generality, let A = W . Let W ′ ⊆W .
Let P ′W ′ = (P
′
i )i∈W ′ be a strategy–profile for W
′. Let µ = ϕ(P ′W ′ , P−W ′ , q). For each w ∈ W ′, let
Iµ(w) = {f : f ∈ µ(w) and f Pw ∅} be the set of firms matched to w at µ and that are acceptable for w
with respect to Pw. For each w ∈ W ′, let Qw ∈ δ(w) be the dropping strategy obtained from Pw by
ranking the firms in Iµ(w) according to the true relative ordering and making all other firms unacceptable.
We need to show that for all w ∈W ′, ϕw(QW ′ , P−W ′ , q) w ϕw(P ′W ′ , P−W ′ , q). Note that by (r1) in the
definition of responsiveness it is sufficient to show that for each w ∈W ′, ϕw(QW ′ , P−W ′ , q) = Iµ(w).
For each w ∈W , let
µ′0(w) =
{
Iµ(w) if w ∈W ′;
µ(w) if w /∈W ′.
20 The proof of Theorem 1 shows that any group of agents on the same side of the market only needs to consider dropping
strategies in which the number of acceptable firms they report is at most their quota. However, they cannot only focus on
dropping strategies in which the number of acceptable firms is equal to their quota (Example 3). We would like to thank
the associate editor for pointing out this fact. We refer to Section 4 for further details.
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Suppose µ′0 is stable with respect to (QW ′ , P−W ′ , q). Let w ∈W ′. Note that in µ′0 agent w is assigned
to all its acceptable partners (with respect to Qw). Hence, by Alkan (2002, Proposition 6), for each stable
matching ν ∈ S(QW ′ , P−W ′ , q), ν(w) = µ′0(w) = Iµ(w).21 By stability of ϕ, ϕw(QW ′ , P−W ′ , q) = Iµ(w),
which we needed to establish.
Suppose µ′0 is not stable with respect to (QW ′ , P−W ′ , q). Before we apply an iterative procedure to
transform µ′0 into a stable matching, we first establish a few properties of µ
′
0:
P1(µ′0) µ
′
0 is individually rational with respect to (QW ′ , P−W ′ , q).
P2(µ′0) If (w, f) is a blocking pair for µ
′
0 with respect to (QW ′ , P−W ′ , q), then w /∈W ′.
P3(µ′0) If (w, f) is a blocking pair for µ
′
0 with respect to (QW ′ , P−W ′ , q), then |µ′0(f)| < qf .
Proof. P1(µ′0) and P2(µ
′
0) are immediate. Next, we show P3(µ
′
0). Suppose it is not the case. Then,
|µ′0(f)| = qf . Since µ′0(f) ⊆ µ(f) and |µ(f)| ≤ qf , µ′0(f) = µ(f). By P2(µ′0), w /∈ W ′. Hence, µ′0(w) =
µ(w). So, (w, f) also blocks µ with respect to (P ′W ′ , P−W ′ , q), which contradicts the stability of µ with
respect to (P ′W ′ , P−W ′ , q). 
Set µ′ := µ′0. As long as µ
′ is not stable with respect to (QW ′ , P−W ′ , q), apply the following procedure.
Begin Procedure.
By P1(µ′), there is at least one blocking pair for µ′ with respect to (QW ′ , P−W ′ , q). Let f ′ be a firm that
is a member of one such blocking pair. Among all workers w involved in blocking pairs (w, f ′) for µ′ with
respect to (QW ′ , P−W ′ , q), let w′ be the most preferred worker with respect to Pf ′ . By P2(µ′), w′ /∈W ′.
By P3(µ′), |µ′(f ′)| < qf ′ . Define
µ′′(w) =
µ
′(w′) ∪ f ′ if w = w′ and |µ′(w′)| < qw′ ;
(µ′(w′) ∪ f ′)\ arg minPw′{f : f ∈ µ′(w′)} if w = w′ and |µ′(w′)| = qw′ ;
µ′(w) if w ∈W\{w′}.
Then,
P1(µ′′) µ′′ is individually rational with respect to (QW ′ , P−W ′ , q);
P2(µ′′) If (w, f) is a blocking pair for µ′′ with respect to (QW ′ , P−W ′ , q), then w /∈W ′; and
P3(µ′′) If (w, f) is a blocking pair for µ′′ with respect to (QW ′ , P−W ′ , q), then |µ′′(f)| < qf .
Set µ′ := µ′′.
End Procedure.
In each iteration, one worker w′ /∈ W ′ gets a strictly better match (with respect to Pw′) and all
other workers keep their match. (This follows from the fact that firm f ′ has a vacant position in µ′.)
Therefore, the iterative procedure terminates after a finite number of steps. The resulting matching µ∗
is stable with respect to (QW ′ , P−W ′ , q). Let w ∈W ′. Since in each iteration of the procedure w keeps it
match, µ∗(w) = µ′0(w) = I
µ(w). Note that in µ∗ agent w is assigned to all its acceptable partners (with
respect to Qw). Hence, by Alkan (2002, Proposition 6), for each stable matching ν ∈ S(QW ′ , P−W ′ , q),
ν(w) = µ∗(w) = Iµ(w). By stability of ϕ, ϕw(QW ′ , P−W ′ , q) = Iµ(w), which we needed to establish.
It only remains to show that in each iteration, µ′′ is a matching that satisfies P1(µ′′), P2(µ′′), and
P3(µ′′). We do this by induction. Suppose that in iteration 1 up to k− 1 the resulting matching satisfies
P1(.), P2(.), and P3(.). Let µ′ be the matching at the beginning of iteration k (and suppose it is not
stable with respect to (QW ′ , P−W ′ , q). Hence, P1(µ′), P2(µ′), and P3(µ′) hold.) We will show that the
matching µ′′ that is obtained in iteration k satisfies P1(µ′′), P2(µ′′), and P3(µ′′).
Proof of P1(µ′′). By the induction hypothesis, µ′ is individually rational with respect to (QW ′ , P−W ′ , q).
The only new mates in µ′′ with respect to µ′ are the pair {w′, f ′}. Since (w′, f ′) is a blocking pair for µ′
and since µ′ is individually rational with respect to (QW ′ , P−W ′ , q), it immediately follows that w′ and
f ′ are mutually acceptable with respect to (QW ′ , P−W ′ , q). Therefore, µ′′ is individually rational with
respect to (QW ′ , P−W ′ , q). 
Proof of P2(µ′′). Suppose w ∈W ′. Since (w, f) blocks µ′′ with respect to (QW ′ , P−W ′ , q), f /∈ µ′′(w). By
the induction hypothesis, in iterations 1 up to k, agent w has kept it original match, i.e., µ′′(w) = µ′0(w).
Hence, w blocks µ′′ together with f /∈ µ′0(w). Recall that Qw is a dropping strategy for which the firms in
µ′0(w) are the only acceptable ones for w. This gives a contradiction to (b2) in the definition of blocking
21 Proposition 6 in Alkan (2002) is an extension of part of a result that is known as the Rural Hospital Theorem (Roth,
1984b) which states that each agent is matched to the same number of partners in every stable matching.
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pair and the individual rationality of µ′0 with respect to (QW ′ , P−W ′ , q), which was established in P1(µ
′
0).
Hence, w /∈W ′. 
Proof of P3(µ′′). Let (w, f) be a blocking pair for µ′′ with respect to (QW ′ , P−W ′ , q). By P2(µ′′), w 6∈W ′.
Suppose |µ′′(f)| = qf . Then, by (b3) in the definition of blocking pair, wPf w˜ for some w˜ ∈ µ′′(f). We
distinguish between two cases.
Case I. (w˜, f) was a blocking pair matched in some iteration l, l ≤ k.
By the induction hypothesis, in iterations l + 1 up to k, worker w 6∈ W ′ either keeps its match from
iteration l or obtains a strictly better match by (possibly repeatedly) adding an acceptable firm and/or
replacing its least preferred mate by a more preferred firm (if its quota is reached). Therefore, since
(w, f) is a blocking pair for µ′′ at the end of iteration k, w is also willing to block (with f) the initial
matching in iteration l and w and f are not mates at the initial matching in iteration l. Since wPf w˜,
firm f did not block with the best possible worker in iteration l, which contradicts the definition of the
procedure.
Case II. w˜ is matched to f in all matchings of iterations 1, . . . , k.
By the induction hypothesis, in iterations 1 up to k, worker w 6∈ W ′ either keeps its match µ′0(w) or
obtains a strictly better match by (possibly repeatedly) adding an acceptable firm and/or replacing
its least preferred mate by a more preferred firm (if its quota is reached). Therefore, since (w, f) is a
blocking pair for µ′′ at the end of iteration k, w is also willing to block (with f) matching µ′0 (with
respect to Pw) and w /∈ µ′0(f). Since wPf w˜ and (by assumption) w˜ ∈ µ′0(f), (w, f) is a blocking pair for
µ′0 with respect to (P
′
W ′ , P−W ′ , q). Since w /∈W ′, it follows from the definition of µ′0 that µ(w˜) = µ′0(w˜).
Hence, (w, f) is a blocking pair for µ with respect to (P ′W ′ , P−W ′ , q), which contradicts the stability of
µ = ϕ(P ′W ′ , P−W ′ , q). 
Next, we consider the truncation correspondence and seek to determine when it is exhaustive.22 Roth
and Vande Vate (1991) studied a matching model making the following assumptions: (1) |W | = |F |, (2)
each agent is acceptable to all agents on the other side of the market, and (3) for each i ∈ I, qi = 1. Their
Theorem 2 says that for each stable mechanism ϕ, the truncation correspondence τ is ϕ–exhaustive for
each agent. It can easily be seen that the first two assumptions can be disposed of. Below, we further
extend the result by relaxing the third assumption as well.
Theorem 2 Let A ∈ {W,F}. Let ϕ be a stable mechanism. Suppose for some a ∈ A, qa = 1. Then, the
truncation correspondence τ is ϕ–exhaustive for agent a.
Proof Let ϕ be a stable mechanism. Let (, q) be a market. Let P be the restriction of  to individual
partners and being unmatched. Without loss of generality, let A = W . Let w ∈W be such that qw = 1.
Let P ′w be a strategy for w. We identify a truncation strategy Qw ∈ τ(w) with ϕw(Qw, P−w, q)
Rw ϕw(P
′
w, P−w, q). By Theorem 1, there is a dropping strategy P
∗
w = ϕw(P
′
w, P−w, q) with
ϕw(P
∗
w, P−w, q)Rw ϕw(P
′
w, P−w, q). Then, it is enough to identify a truncation strategy Qw with
ϕw(Qw, P−w, q) Rw ϕw(P ∗w, P−w, q). We distinguish between two cases.
Case I. ∅Rw ϕw(P ∗w, P−w, q).
Let Qw = ∅ be the empty truncation strategy. Then, by the stability of ϕ, ϕw(Qw, P−w, q) = ∅. Hence,
ϕw(Qw, P−w, q)Rw ϕw(P ∗w, P−w, q).
Case II. ϕw(P
∗
w, P−w, q)Pw ∅.
Note that ϕw(P
∗
w, P−w, q) ∈ F . Let f∗ = ϕw(P ∗w, P−w, q). Let Qw be the truncation of Pw such that f∗
is the last acceptable firm. Let Q = (Qw, P−w). We first show that for all µ ∈ S(Q, q), µ(w)Rw f∗.
Suppose, to the contrary, that there is some µ˜ ∈ S(Q, q) with f∗ Pw µ˜(w). Then, since each firm f
with f∗Pwf is not listed (i.e., acceptable) in Qw and since µ˜ is individually rational with respect to Q,
µ˜(w) = ∅. By Alkan (2002, Proposition 6), for all µ ∈ S(Q, q), µ(w) = ∅. In particular, ϕWw (Q, q) = ∅.
We need to show that ϕW (Q, q) is stable under (P ∗w, P−w, q). Suppose, to the contrary, that there is a
blocking pair for ϕW (Q, q) under (P ∗w, P−w, q). Then, the same pair blocks ϕ
W (Q, q) under (Q, q). Hence,
ϕW (Q, q) is not stable under (Q, q), contradicting the stability of ϕW . Since ϕWw (Q, q) = ∅, by Alkan
(2002, Proposition 6) and the stability of ϕ, ϕw(P
∗
w, P−w, q) = ∅, contradicting ϕw(P ∗w, P−w, q) = f∗.
Hence, for all µ ∈ S(Q, q), µ(w)Rw f∗. Since ϕ(Q, q) ∈ S(Q, q), ϕw(Q, q)Rw f∗ = ϕw(P ∗w, P−w, q). 
22 Truncation strategies have been extensively studied in the matching literature (Roth and Vande Vate, 1991, Ehlers,
2008, Romm, 2011, Ashlagi and Klijn, 2012, Coles and Shorrer, 2012, among others). Moreover, they have been used in
practice, for instance, in the sorority rush (Mongell and Roth, 1991).
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We complement Theorem 2 with two examples to show that it cannot be extended in the following
two ways. The truncation correspondence is
– neither necessarily ϕ–exhaustive for an agent a if qa > 1 and for all i ∈ I\{a}, qi = 1 (Example 1);
– nor necessarily ϕ–exhaustive for a group of agents on the same side of the market if for all i ∈ I,
qi = 1 (Example 2).
Example 1 (The truncation correspondence τ is not necessarily ϕ–exhaustive for an agent
a ∈ A if qa >1.)23
Consider a many–to–one matching market (W,F,, q) with 3 workers, 4 firms, and preferences over
individual partners P given by the columns in Table 1. All potential partners are acceptable. For instance,
Pf1 = w3 w1 w2 ∅. Worker w1 has quota qw1 = 2. Any other agent i has quota qi = 1.
Table 1 Preferences P in Example 1
Workers Firms
w1 w2 w3 f1 f2 f3 f4
f1 f1 f3 w3 w2 w1 w1
f2 f2 f1 w1 w1 w3 w2
f3 f3 f2 w2 w3 w2 w3
f4 f4 f4
One easily verifies that the unique stable matching µ for (P, q) is given by
w1 w2 w3
µ : | | |
{f3, f4} f2 f1
which is the boxed matching in Table 1.
Consider the (dropping) strategy P ′w1 = f1 f4 for worker w1. Let P
′ = (P ′w1 , P−w1). The unique stable
matching for (P ′, q) is given by
w1 w2 w3
µ′ : | | |
{f1, f4} f2 f3
which is the boldfaced matching in Table 1. Note that µ′(w1) = {f1, f4} w1 {f3, f4} = µ(w1) for each
responsive extension w1 of Pw1 . Since µ and µ′ are the unique stable matchings for (P, q) and (P ′, q),
respectively, it follows that under each stable mechanism, in market (, q) firm w1 can strictly improve
its match by misreporting its preferences.
Table 2 Truncations and matches of w1 in Example 1
Qw1 ϕw1 (Qw1 , P−w1 )
f1 f2 f3 f4 {f3, f4}
f1 f2 f3 f3
f1 f2 f1
f1 f1
In Table 2, we indicate the match of worker w1 under each stable mechanism ϕ and for each profile
(Qw1 , P−w1) where Qw1 is a truncation strategy. One immediately verifies that no individual truncation
strategy for w1 replicates or improves upon the match {f1, f4} = ϕw1(P ′w1 , P−w1).
Following the proof of Theorem 1, for each truncation strategy Qw1 of w1, we provide a dropping
strategy that consists of the acceptable firms that are matched to w1 at ϕ(Qw1 , P−{w1}) in the true relative
23 The preferences P are adapted from Roth (1985a, p. 283, Table I) and Roth and Sotomayor (1990, p. 146).
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order. Instead of truncation strategy Qw1 = f1 f2 f3 f4, w1 can use dropping strategy Q
′
w1 = f3 f4 to be
matched to {f3, f4}. Instead of Qw1 = f1 f2 f3, w1 can use dropping strategy Q′w1 = f3 to be matched to{f3}. Instead of truncation strategies Qw1 = f1 f2 and Qw1 = f1, w1 can use dropping strategy Q′w1 = f1
to be matched to {f1}.
Also, note that by introducing additional workers and firms, the negative result here can be extended
in a straightforward way to situations in which for all i ∈ I\{a}, qi ≥ 1. 
Example 2 (The truncation correspondence τ is not necessarily ϕ–exhaustive for a group of
agents on the same side of the market if for all i ∈ I, qi = 1.)
Consider the one–to–one matching market (W,F,, q) with 4 workers, 4 firms, and preferences P
given by the columns in Table 3. Only acceptable partners are depicted in Table 3. For instance, Pw1 =
f4 f2 f3 ∅ f1. For each agent i ∈ I, qi = 1.
Table 3 Preferences P in Example 2
Workers Firms
w1 w2 w3 w4 f1 f2 f3 f4
f4 f1 f3 f4 w3 w4 w1 w2
f2 f4 f1 f3 w4 w1 w4 w1
f3 f1 w2 w3 w4
f2
One easily verifies that the firm–optimal stable matching µ = ϕF (P, q) is given by
w1 w2 w3 w4
µ : | | | |
f3 f4 f1 f2
which is the boxed matching in Table 3.
Consider the profile of (dropping) strategies (P ′w1 , P
′
w2) where P
′
w1 = f2 and P
′
w2 = f1. Let P
′ =
(P ′w1 , P
′
w2 , P−{w1,w2}). The firm–optimal stable matching µ
′ = ϕF (P ′, q) now equals
w1 w2 w3 w4
µ′ : | | | |
f2 f1 f3 f4
which is the boldfaced matching in Table 3. Note that µ′(w1) = f2 Pw1 f3 = µ(w1) and µ
′(w2) =
f1 Pw2 f4 = µ(w2). It follows that under the firm–optimal stable mechanism, in market (, q) workers
{w1, w2} can strictly improve their matches by jointly misreporting their preferences.
Table 4 Truncations of w1, w2 and matches of w2 in Example 2
Qw1 Qw2 ϕ
F
w2
(Qw1 , Qw2P−{w1,w2})
f4 f2 f3 f1 f4 f4
f4 f2 f1 f4 f4
f4 f1f4 f4
f4 f2 f3 f1 ∅
f4 f2 f1 ∅
f4 f1 ∅
In Table 4, we indicate the match of worker w2 under the firm–optimal stable mechanism ϕ
F for each
profile (Qw1 , Qw2P−{w1,w2}) where Qw1 and Qw2 are truncation strategies.
24 One immediately verifies
24 For each pair of truncation strategies of w1 and w2, we can construct a pair of dropping strategies that consist of the
acceptable firms that they are matched to at ϕ(Qw1 , Qw2P−{w1,w2}) in the true relative order (as described in the proof
of Theorem 1). Then, these dropping strategies yield the same matches for w1 and w2.
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that no pair of truncation strategies for w1 and w2 leads to a match for w2 that is weakly preferred to
f1 = ϕ
F
w2(P
′
w1 , P
′
w2 , P−{w1,w2}). 
We conclude with Table 5, which summarizes all our (positive and negative) findings.
Table 5 Summary of results. Given the quotas of the workers and firms, + (−) means that the correspondence is (not
necessarily) exhaustive.
Quotas ϕ–exhaustive Quotas ϕ–exhaustive
Worker Other Firms for Workers Firms for
w workers worker w a group of workers
Dropping
correspondence ≥ 1 ≥ 1 + (Theorem 1) ≥ 1 ≥ 1 + (Theorem 1)
Truncation = 1 ≥ 1 ≥ 1 + (Theorem 2)
correspondence > 1 = 1 = 1 − (Example 1) = 1 = 1 − (Example 2)
4 Concluding Remarks
In this section, we discuss three important issues. First, we briefly comment on setwise stable mechanisms.
Second, we show that there is a subcorrespondence of the dropping correspondence that is exhaustive.
We also show this subcorrespondence cannot be “reduced” further. Finally, we explore the number of
truncation strategies an agent with quota 1 has to consider in any stable mechanism.
Our results also hold for setwise stable mechanisms.25 Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 still hold under
setwise stability since whenever the set of setwise stable matchings is non-empty, it is a subset of the
set of pairwise stable matchings. Moreover, the conclusions in Examples 1 and 2 are still valid since the
matchings in the examples are setwise stable.
An exhaustive correspondence is minimal if there is no proper subcorrespondence that is exhaustive
as well. The dropping correspondence δ is not minimal. To see this, for an agent i with quota qi, consider
the subcorrespondence δ≤ that associates each i with the subset of dropping strategies with at most
qi acceptable partners. Formally, let A(Pi) be the set of acceptable partners under Pi and δ≤(i) =
{P ′i is a dropping strategy of Pi and 0 ≤ |A(P ′i )| ≤ qi}. The proof of Theorem 1 shows that for any stable
mechanism ϕ, δ≤ is ϕ–exhaustive for a group of agents on the same side of the market. However, agents
cannot exclusively focus on dropping strategies in which the number of acceptable partners is equal to
their quota. Formally, for each agent i, let δ=(i) = {P ′i is a dropping strategy of Pi and |A(P ′i )| = qi}.
In the next example, we show that δ= is not necessarily ϕ
F –exhaustive for a worker.
Example 3 (δ= is not necessarily ϕ
F –exhaustive for a worker.)
Consider the many–to–one matching market (W,F,, q) with 2 workers, 2 firms, and preferences over
individual partners P given by the columns in Table 6. All potential partners are acceptable. Worker w1
has quota qw1 = 2. Any other agent i has quota qi = 1.
Table 6 Preferences P in Example 3
Workers Firms
w1 w2 f1 f2
f1 f2 w2 w1
f2 f1 w1 w2
25 A setwise stable matching is an individually rational matching that cannot be blocked by a coalition that forms
new matches only among its members, but may preserve some of its matches outside of the coalition. See Roth (1984a),
Sotomayor (1999b), and Echenique and Oviedo (2006) for a discussion on setwise stability.
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One easily verifies that the firm–optimal stable matching µ = ϕF (P, q) is given by
w1 w2
µ : | |
f2 f1
which is the boxed matching in Table 6.
Note that δ=(w1) = {Pw1}. Now, consider the strategy P ′w1 = f1 for worker w1. Let P ′ =
(P ′w1 , P−w1). The firm–optimal stable matching µ
′ = ϕF (P ′, q) is given by
w1 w2
µ′ : | |
f1 f2
which is the boldfaced matching in Table 6.
Then, ϕFw1(P
′
w1 , P−w1 , q) w1 ϕFw1(Pw1 , P−w1 , q). Hence, the correspondence δ= is not ϕF –exhaustive
for w1. 
The minimum number of strategies that an agent should consider depends on the mechanism at
hand. For instance, in the many–to–one matching model (where workers’ quotas equal one), the worker–
optimal stable mechanism is strategy–proof for the workers. Hence, in that case each worker w only
needs 1 truncation strategy, namely Pw. Formally, let the identity correspondence Ψ be defined by
Ψ(w) = {Pw} for all preference relations w. Then, under the worker–optimal stable mechanism ϕW ,
the identity correspondence is exhaustive and trivially minimal for each worker.
However, the next example shows that under the firm–optimal stable mechanism ϕF , the truncation
correspondence is (exhaustive and) minimal for each worker. The two observations about ϕW and ϕF
imply that for any stable mechanism the number of truncation strategies that a worker w has to consider
is between 1 and max{1, |A(Pw)|}. (The worker–optimal stable mechanism and the firm–optimal stable
mechanism show that the bounds are tight.)
Example 4 Consider the one–to–one matching market (W,F, P, q) with k workers, k firms, and prefer-
ences over individual partners P given by the columns in Table 7. Only acceptable partners are depicted
in Table 7. For each i ∈ I, qi = 1.
Table 7 Preferences P in Example 4
Workers Firms
w1 ... wp−1 wp ... wk−2 wk−1 wk f1 ... fp−1 fp ... fk−2 fk−1 fk
f1
... fp−1 fp+1
... fk−1 fk f1 w1
... wp−1 wp
... wk−2 wk−1 wk
fp
... fk−2 fk−1 f2 wk
... wk wk wk−1
... wp−1
... wk−3 wk−2
fp
...
fk
One easily verifies that the firm–optimal stable matching µ = ϕF (P, q) is given by
w1 ... wp−1 wp ... wk−2 wk−1 wk
µ : | ... | | ... | | |
f1 ... fp−1 fp ... fk−2 fk−1 fk.
Now, consider the truncation strategy P ′wk = f1f2...fp for worker wk. Let P
′ = (P ′wk , P−wk). The
firm–optimal stable matching µ′ = ϕF (P ′, q) is given by
w1 ... wp−1 wp ... wk−2 wk−1 wk
µ′ : | ... | | ... | | |
f1 ... fp−1 fp+1 ... fk−1 fk fp.
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One immediately verifies that no other truncation strategy leads to a match for wk that is preferred
to fp = ϕ
F
wk
(P ′, q). (Under any truncation strategy in which the number of acceptable firms l is such
that p < l ≤ k, wk is matched to fl and fpPwkfl. Under any truncation strategy in which the number of
acceptable firms is such that l < p, wk remains unmatched and fpPwk∅.)
Note that in this example, by varying p between 1 and k, we obtain a problem in which P ′wk is the
unique optimal truncation strategy of wk (which matches him to fp). Hence, for each truncation strategy
with at least one acceptable firm, there is a problem in which the worker has to use this truncation
strategy. For the truncation strategy with no acceptable firms, consider a problem in which a worker
has a preference relation with no acceptable firms. Then, the worker uses his unique truncation strategy,
namely the empty truncation strategy. Hence, under ϕF , worker w has to consider max{1, |A(Pw)|}
truncation strategies.26 
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